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Abstract: Control on regional government budgets is 
important in a monetary union as lower tiers of 
government have fewer incentives to consolidate debt. 
According to the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level; 
unsustainable non-Ricardian fiscal policies eventually 
force monetary policy to adjust. Hence, uncoordinated and 
non-regulated regional fiscal policies would therefore 
threaten price stability for the monetary union as a whole. 
However, the union central bank is not without defense. A 
federal government that internalises the spillover effect of 
non-Ricardian fiscal policies on the price level can offset 
non-Ricardian regional fiscal policies. A federal 
government, which taxes and transfers resources between 
regions, may compensate for unsustainable regional fiscal 
policies so as to keep fiscal policy Ricardian on aggregate. 
Following Canzoneri et al. (2001), we test the validity of 
the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level for both federal and 
regional governments in Germany. We find evidence of a 
spillover effect of unsustainable policies on the price level 
for other Länder. However, the German federal 
government offsets this effect on the price level by running 
Ricardian policies. These results have implications for the 
regulation of fiscal policies in the EMU. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Fiscal discipline is not assured if the fiscal relations between different governments in a 
monetary union, like the EMU, are not clearly spelled out. The root of the problem is free 
riding between the different fiscal authorities and the single central bank. The benefits of 
additional spending accrue to the region, but the consequences of fiscal profligacy are 
spread out over all tiers of government instead of burdening the local population with the cost 
of fiscal adjustment. The economic (and political) cost of a spending cut, a tax rise or outright 
default can be shifted to other governments. This cost can also be shifted to the central bank. 
Debt accumulation by regional governments may pressure the common monetary policy to 
give in to calls for lower interest rates, and higher inflation (Beetsma and Uhlig, 1999; Chari 
and Kehoe, 2004). There can also be a direct link from fiscal insolvency to the price level. 
According to the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL), fiscal – rather than monetary – 
policy determines the price level (Leeper, 1991; Sims, 1994). If the fiscal authority fails to 
take action to ensure its intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied, and government 
solvency eventually has to be ensured in real terms, monetary policy can only ‘passively’ 
give in to a non-Ricardian fiscal policy. The implications of the FTPL in the context of 
monetary union are relatively straightforward. It is sufficient to have one insolvent 
government that sets policy ‘actively’ to have it determine the price level for the union as a 
whole (Bergin, 2000; Canzoneri et al., 2001).1 Thereby, fiscal solvency cannot be guaranteed 
for any other government in the monetary union.  
 
The existence of soft budget constraints in a monetary union requires a control system on 
the sustainability of public finances. In EMU, the deficit rule of the Stability Pact and the no-
bailout clause of the Treaty separate responsibilities between the various national fiscal 
policies. Federal fiscal structures usually have a more complex regulation of fiscal policies, 
however. Unlike EMU, most monetary unions like Germany, the US, Brazil or Argentina have 
a federal government that takes care of aggregate union interests, and whose authority 
usually precedes that of the second tier of regional governments. Whereas there usually is a 
constitutionally determined division of spending tasks between these different tiers of 
government, tax revenues are shared. In addition to (horizontal) transfers between regional 
governments, (vertical) transfers from the federal government complement regional budgets. 
The federal government may provide the necessary fiscal means to pay off debt. These 
transfers of wealth from one level to the other can offset the effect on monetary policy. Ex 
ante, tax sharing agreements and joint spending schemes often provide implicit additional 
                                                 
1 Except in the case in which this price level would be exactly right to offset the debt position of other 
governments.  
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financing of regional budgets. Ex post, and in extreme cases, this may even entail an explicit 
bail out. The variety of fiscal arrangements in different countries makes it hard to examine 
the interaction between regional and federal policies. Some recent studies have made some 
progress at the theoretical level (Inman, 2003). However, these models are often much 
stylised, and do not grasp all institutional and economic aspects of fiscal federalism. 
 
In this paper, we give empirical evidence for these interactions between government tiers by 
using data on the federal and regional budgets in Germany. We use a test developed by 
Canzoneri et al. (2001) for distinguishing Ricardian from non-Ricardian fiscal regimes. We 
look into the responses of shocks to the surplus ratio on public debt, and the autocorrelation 
properties of the surplus, to tell whether the fiscal policies of federal and lower tier 
governments are ‘active’ or ‘passive’. In contrast to previous studies that tested FTPL on 
consolidated general government data, we look into the effects of federal and regional fiscal 
policies, and their interplay, on the price level. We find that some regions are running 
unsustainable fiscal policies. These non-Ricardian policies spillover to the other regions: a 
panel VAR shows that on aggregate, regional budgets are unsustainable. In contrast, federal 
fiscal policy is Ricardian. Actually, the federal government offsets regional fiscal problems as 
we do not find evidence that fiscal series for the general government are non-Ricardian. We 
interpret this as evidence that the German federal government internalises the effect of 
regional fiscal policies on the common monetary policy stance. The free riding result between 
the various regional governments vis-à-vis the general government (federal government plus 
central bank) still holds. However, the federal government shields the central bank from non-
Ricardian policies. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we discuss the applications of the FTPL in a 
federation. We extend the test for classifying Ricardian and Non-Ricardian regimes in fiscal 
policy to different government tiers. We present some data on the structure of fiscal policy in 
Germany. We discuss the results in section 3. Policy implications are discussed in section 4. 
 
2. SUSTAINABILITY OF FISCAL POLICIES UNDER A COMMON CURRENCY 
 
Starting point for the discussion is the flow government budget constraint. This describes the 
period-by-period dynamics of total debt bt  as the accumulation due to interest payments on 
past fiscal imbalances and the current primary surplus, which is the difference of government 
revenues tT  – inclusive of seigniorage revenues tM  – and government spending tG . All 
variables in (1) are expressed in nominal terms. 
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We can rewrite the flow budget constraint in terms of total government liabilities, and take 
into account economic growth by scaling to GDP. We then get 
.
)/)(1(1 11
11
1
1
1 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
++⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+−=+
++
++
+
+
+
tt
tt
ttt
t
t
t
t
tt
t
tt
tt
tt
tt
YP
BM
PPi
Y
Y
i
i
YP
M
YP
GT
YP
BM
  (2) 
Total government liabilities have to equal the primary surplus (as a ratio to GDP) plus the 
discounted value of next period’s total liabilities. This discount factor is the ratio of real GDP 
growth to the real interest rate. If tw  is the ratio of liabilities to GDP (including base money 
plus government bonds), ts  the surplus to GDP ratio, and tα  the discount factor, (2) 
becomes 
1++= tttt wsw α       (3) 
By solving forward (3),  
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There are two alternative views on this expression for the present value of liabilities. The 
common interpretation is that (4) is the intertemporal government budget constraint. The 
government cannot run unsustainable policies but should pay off, monetise or refinance debt. 
In contrast, the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL) does not interpret this as a constraint 
to be satisfied, but as an equilibrium condition. This condition can be satisfied in two different 
ways. The government can behave in the way just described. Fiscal policy endogenously 
adjusts the sequence { }ts  so that it satisfies (4), regardless of the values of nominal income 
and discount factors. Following Woodford (2001), we call this the Ricardian regime (R).2 
Instead, if the government does not adjust ts , the surplus is just an exogenous process 
unrelated to debt. In order to satisfy (4), then either the discount factor or the liabilities to 
GDP ratio have to adjust. This is the non-Ricardian regime (NR). 
 
If the fiscal authority fails to take actions to ensure its intertemporal budget constraint is 
satisfied, it is fiscal – rather than monetary – policy that is the nominal anchor for the 
economy (Leeper, 1991; Sims, 1994). As government solvency eventually has to be ensured 
in real terms, monetary policy can only ‘passively’ give in. If fiscal policy is instead sufficiently 
                                                 
2 Or passive regime in Leeper’s terminology. 
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reactive to debt, the intertemporal government budget constraint will be satisfied for all 
possible price paths. Monetary policy retains the ability to control prices in the Ricardian 
regime. Eventually, the responsibility for the price level is always in the hands of the fiscal 
authority then.  
 
The discussion on the empirical plausibility of R or NR regimes runs into some identification 
problems. A formal test for an R or NR regime is impossible. Both regimes are 
observationally equivalent, and we only observe the equilibrium outcome under each regime. 
A positive response of the primary surplus to government liabilities does not give an 
indication on the exact regime. There is indeed a positive relationship between the surplus 
and total liabilities in an R world: a higher surplus today pays off debt. This is also the 
argumentation Bohn (1998) gives for the positive debt response in a fiscal rule. Yet, the 
same positive relationship can also be observed in an NR regime. The causality runs the 
other way, however: liabilities respond to the expected vale of present and future surpluses. 
Looking at the contemporaneous correlation between government surplus and liabilities does 
not give an answer. 
 
Canzoneri et al. (2001) propose a test that is based on (a) the response of liabilities to 
innovations in the surplus, and (b) the serial correlation of the surplus.3 They distinguish 
between both regimes by the sign of the serial correlation of the surplus. The argument that a 
negative correlation makes the NR regime theoretically implausible, runs as follows. A 
positive innovation in the surplus that moreover raises future surpluses implies that public 
debt is being paid off. Government liabilities fall after a positive shock to the surplus. This is 
an R regime. It would also be clear that there is an NR regime in two different cases. First, 
the rise in the surplus does pay off debt, but due to the revaluation effect of nominal income 
in the NR regime, liabilities increase. The net effect is nil. The surplus ts  does not correlate 
with future surpluses then. Second, there is also an NR regime in case future liabilities 
should rise after the surplus innovation and the shock to the surplus is positively correlated 
with future surpluses. But there is a third NR regime that gives the same prediction for the fall 
in liabilities as in the R regime. After a positive shock to the surplus, nominal income and/or 
the expected future fiscal surpluses must move to achieve fiscal balance in the NR regime. 
Future liabilities would fall in an NR regime if the shock to the surplus is negatively correlated 
with future surpluses. Given that we usually observe positive serial correlation in surpluses, it 
is only possible to make this occur if there were to be a strong negative correlation of the 
surplus at longer horizons. Moreover, these deficits would need to be so large to make the 
                                                 
3 For different attempts to test the FTPL, see Cochrane (1998), Hetzel and Leach (2001), Woodford (2001) or 
Sala (2004). 
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present value of surpluses fall. This implies that deficits are so large, persistent or heavily 
discounted that they can offset the initial increase in the surplus.4 Expression (3) does not 
only allow for changes in nominal liabilities. The stochastic discount factors { tα } may move 
as well to make the budget constraint hold in equilibrium. A negative correlation of surpluses 
with future discount factors would make the NR regime more plausible.  
 
In summary, the positive correlation between ts  and tw  does not allow distinguishing 
between an R and NR regime. However, we can distinguish the regimes by looking (a) at the 
impulse responses in a VAR including the surplus and liabilities, and (b) the autocorrelation 
function of the surplus. We also add the discount factor to this VAR to check the results for a 
possible impact of the surplus. The identification assumption in this VAR is a simple cholesky 
ordering. Both orderings of surplus and debt are equally possible.5 If we order the surplus 
first, the innovation to the surplus is indeed an exogenous shock. This makes more sense in 
an NR regime. This allows for a contemporaneous response in the liabilities ratio: nominal 
GDP (or discount factors) jumps to ensure that outstanding liabilities equal the expected 
present value of surpluses. In contrast, if we order liabilities first, nominal GDP might be 
determined exogenously. We can identify a shock to the surplus to GDP ratio that does not 
have a contemporaneous impact on liabilities. This ordering would favour an R regime. A rise 
or a non-significant response of liabilities to a shock in the surplus indicates non-Ricardian 
fiscal policy. A fall in liabilities is only consistent with an NR regime in case the surplus 
displays negative serial correlation. In order to allow for the jump in nominal income in the 
NR regime, we express both the surplus and government liabilities as a ratio to GDP. 
 
The implications of the FTPL in the context of monetary union are relatively straightforward. 
All regional governments will pursue ‘active’ policies and run up deficits. It is sufficient to 
have one insolvent government that sets policy in a non-Ricardian way to have it determine 
the price level for the union as a whole (Bergin, 2000; Canzoneri et al., 2001). A rise in the 
level of debt in one region spills over to the common price level of monetary union. Thereby, 
fiscal solvency cannot be guaranteed for any other government in the monetary union.6 As a 
                                                 
4 Canzoneri et al. (2001) go on arguing that this negative correlation makes the NR regime implausible. If the 
government decides to raise the surplus today, it would change its policy into a deficit at some time in the future. 
But given that the surplus in an NR regime is determined by an exogenous process, this change in policy should 
happen for some exogenous reason that is not related to the level of public debt. The economic model behind this 
behaviour of the government is not clear. Cochrane (1998) makes some suggestions, however.  
5 We order α  last. 
6 A possible solution to this problem is to impose a limit on regional government budgets. A deficit or debt rule 
ensures solvency of each regional government and rules out the possibility that one region may set the price 
level. 
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consequence, an NR regime in one region is sufficient to find effects of the region’s fiscal 
policy on prices in all other regions, and in the aggregate. 
 
However, there are two cases in which this result does not need to hold. First, the common 
price level could be exactly right to offset the debt position for each regional government. 
Second, and more importantly, fiscal solvency is not strictly necessary for each member 
government in a monetary union to maintain a stable price level. There are multiple regional 
budget constraints but the aggregate government budget constraint can still be viewed as 
jointly determining the price level. There are several ways in which the budget constraint of a 
non-Ricardian government may be satisfied by transferring resources to the region with 
unsustainable fiscal policies. Cross-regional transfers (such as transfers ex ante, or a bailout 
ex post) would allow several governments to be insolvent without effects on the price level as 
long as overall sustainability is maintained (Bergin, 2000). This is not a stable solution, 
however: citizens of one region might not be willing to continuously transfer wealth to cover 
budget deficits in other regions without eventual repayment.7 There are (political) limits on 
international risk sharing (Sims, 1999). In a political federation, these limits are less binding. 
The federal government can tax all individuals and transfer resources across regions. It can 
do so by explicitly bailing out regions ex post or implicitly provide additional resources ex 
ante (by awarding additional grants to the regional budget). Wealth transfers between 
regions are not uncommon. These transfers can also be sustained over time. Their level 
depends on the political equilibrium in the federation. 
 
As a consequence, the federal government is an additional player in the game between 
central bank and the regions. Even if the central bank cannot commit to a tough monetary 
stance, a federal government that is concerned about the spillover effect on the common 
price level of unsustainable regional policies can offset the inflationary effect. There is no 
need that regional governments give up their lax policies, or the central bank to commit for 
this result to hold. Eventually, fiscal policy at regional level can still be unsustainable. Fiscal 
and monetary policy will not need to follow a non-Ricardian regime, thanks to the strict 
budget stance of the federal government. In this way, the federal government eventually 
solves the free riding problem for aggregate variables. The existence of a federal 
government is an effective commitment device. It does not directly solve the problem of free 
riding at the regional level. In fact, it prevents the central bank from engaging in a non-
Ricardian policy. However, in a monetary union, and in the absence of a federal government, 
                                                 
7 Solidarity between citizens of different regions spurs much political debate in federal countries. The debate 
usually focuses on the level of redistribution between poor and rich regions, much less so on the inflationary 
consequences of regional budgets. 
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NR behaviour of one government leads to a NR outcome for all governments of the same 
tier. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. Testing the FTPL in a federation 
 
Applications following Canzoneri et al. (2001) have typically tested the FTPL for general 
government data.8 We simply extend this FTPL test for different government tiers. The 
predictions are rather different whether we test FTPL in a monetary union like EMU, or a 
political federation. 
 
As previously mentioned, in a monetary union, and in the absence of a federal government, 
NR behaviour of one government leads to a NR outcome for all governments of the same 
tier. We thus need to test first whether each regional government runs a Ricardian or non-
Ricardian fiscal policy. We do so with a VAR in surplus, liabilities and discount factors. If we 
find that in at least one region fiscal policy is non-Ricardian, then the empirical prediction is 
that regional fiscal policies are in an NR regime on aggregate. This is nothing else than 
verifying the arguments put forward by Sims (1999) and Bergin (2000). We do so by testing 
the surplus-debt relation in a panel VAR. 
 
The main novel proposition is that the federal government internalises the spillover effect of 
NR policies on the price level. If there is indeed free riding among regional governments, the 
federal government might compensate for this with a Ricardian policy. But finding a federal R 
regime is not sufficient for independence of the central bank. If the federal government 
indeed redistributes resources among regions, then the consolidated budget series should 
behave as in an R regime. We can verify this only if we can show that general government 
budget series are Ricardian. 
 
Testing the FTPL on different government levels involves some issues on the data to use. 
Strictly speaking, government liabilities include government debt as well as the money base 
measured at the beginning of the fiscal year. Both series are then divided by nominal GDP of 
the current year. A division of the money base on a regional basis is not possible. There are 
simply no data series available. Moreover, in many countries, as in Germany or indeed EMU, 
the constitution prohibits direct central bank financing of regional budgets. As a 
                                                 
8 Brazil (Tanner and Ramos, 2002), UK (Janssen et al., 2002), or Germany and Spain (Thams, 2007). 
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consequence, we choose to exclude the money base also from the federal and general 
government data.9 A second issue in a monetary union are the discount factors to use. We 
may approximate these with the yield on government bonds. However, regional interest rates 
on government bonds are available over a brief period of time only and the spreads between 
regional interest rates are negligible (Fitch, 2005). We choose the German ‘federal’ interest 
rate on one year government bonds, although this is an exogenous variable for the German 
regions. As the discount factor is not endogenous, we simply control the surplus-debt relation 
for possible jumps in it. 
 
3.2. The ‘Bundesrepublik Deutschland’ 
 
Germany is an interesting example to test fiscal regimes on different government levels. Both 
the federal and the regional governments (Länder) have important fiscal powers. German 
regional policies are as important as the federal budget in determining the overall budget 
balance. Each has under control about half of total public spending. There is one big 
government confronting 16 smaller players. There are fiscal transfers between the federal 
government, and among the 16 Länder. Fiscal homogeneity across German Länder requires 
the balancing of resources over different tiers of government and between economically 
weak and strong regions. This horizontal repartition of government revenues 
(‘Länderfinanzausgleich’) is explicitly written into the German Constitution. These are further 
complemented with vertical transfers from the federal level to further reduce economic 
disparities and finance specific tasks. Germany is an interesting example for another reason 
too. Fiscal problems have been common, and the federal government has come to the 
rescue of two Länder in the early nineties (Saarland and Bremen) with a bail out. 
 
Data on German fiscal policies come from different sources. General government series are 
from the OECD.10 Data for the federal government are available from the Public Finances 
Series of the Statistisches Bundesamt (Fachserie 14, Reihe 3.1). Regional budget data were 
provided by the Ministry of Finance. Fiscal data are consolidated across Länder and towns. 
The series include the horizontal transfers between Länder, and the vertical transfers from 
the federal government. Land GDP comes from the revised data from the 
Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen der Länder. Data cover the sample 1970-2005, and 
are annual. The Reunification of Germany urges us to consider some different sample 
periods. We control for the shift in data with an impulse dummy and a time trend as of 1991 
                                                 
9 The classification of fiscal policy as R or NR does not change if we add the money base. 
10 We cleaned the German data for the sale of the UMTS licenses, which had an unusually large budget impact in 
2000. 
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when we consider the full sample. In addition, we consider two different periods: 1970-1990 
for the old Länder; 1991-2005 for both new and old Länder. The former Eastern German 
Länder have participated in the Finanzausgleich system since 1994 only. We finish the 
sample in 2005 as a major reform of the German fiscal system has taken place. 
 
The aggregate deficit of the Länder has been rather constant since the seventies at about 
1% (figure 1). Most of the variation in the balance of the general government is due to 
changes in the fiscal stance of the federal government. These reflect the strong spending 
boost of the Brandt government around 1976, German Reunification (1991) and the 
consolidation since entry in EMU (1999). The federal government and the Länder contribute 
in almost equal proportions of 30 per cent to the overall debt position. German Reunification 
has been nearly completely financed by federal debt issues. In recent years, the federal 
government contributes about 10 per cent more than the regional tier. 
 
FIGURE 1 
 
We have displayed the deficit ratios for the German Länder in figure 2. The situation of the 
three city-states (Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg) and the smallest German region (Saarland) 
are illustrative of the evolution of public finances of all Länder. The first characteristic 
concerns the bailed out states. The peak in deficits in Saarland and Bremen in 1992 shows 
the enormous fiscal havoc in both states that led to the federal bail out in 1993. The 
continuous financial support to both regions has only in part led to a reduction in deficits, and 
deficits have continued to grow in recent years. A second striking feature of figure 2 is the 
dramatic fall in Berlin’s budget surplus. This is part of a phenomenon observed in all former 
Eastern-German Länder. Deficits quickly shot up directly after Reunification as the new 
states faced very large spending responsibilities at a moment that economic transition 
caused revenues to fall.11 Until 1994, a large gap between both sides of the budget 
persisted. At that point, these states entered the Finanzausgleich system, and were entitled 
to extra revenues. The consequent increase in revenues brought state budgets closer to 
equilibrium. In contrast to Berlin, most former Eastern German states have been able to 
contain deficits to a level that is only slightly higher than in the old Länder. A final feature of 
the fiscal behaviour of lower tiers is the build-up of deficits during the eighties in old Länder. 
After Reunification, these Länder have kept deficits under control, but this has become more 
difficult in recent years. Deficits have started to grow again in all Länder. As a consequence, 
the steady position of debt in a range of about 10 to 25 per cent across Western German 
                                                 
11 The only exception here is Sachsen. 
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Länder has not been kept (figure 3). The debt evolution highlights differences in deficits in 
the Eastern and Western German Länder. Public debt levels in the Eastern Länder seem to 
converge to the German average of about 35%. Berlin and Bremen, and to a lesser extent 
Saarland, are accumulating ever more debt.12 
 
FIGURE 2 
 
FIGURE 3 
 
These figures do not suggest a clear positive correlation between the surplus and debt. 
Fiscal policy, whether at the central or regional government level, seems to have responded 
only sporadically to the rising level of debt. Persistent deficits put public debt on a rising 
trend. We turn to a detailed empirical analysis of these series to discern R from NR regimes. 
 
3.3. Results: The spillover of regional fiscal policies 
 
The VAR includes the surplus ratio, the liabilities ratio and the exogenous discount factor 
(and a constant). Both variables are expressed as a ratio to GDP. The BIC test indicates that 
the optimal length of the VAR is two years. We present in the main part the results for a VAR 
in which liabilities are ordered first. The impulse response functions are computed for a one 
standard deviation shock to the surplus ratio, and are plotted with 95% asymptotic error 
bounds. 
 
Let us first look at the behaviour of the fiscal policies of the Länder. We are mainly interested 
in the sign of the debt response after an innovation in the surplus. For parsimony, we present 
the accumulated responses at a horizon of two, five and eight years and their significance in 
table format. Table 1 shows that there in most Länder, the accumulated response to a 
surplus shock is negative. This response is also significant. Moreover, the autocorrelation 
function in table 2 shows that surpluses are positively correlated. This would indicate that 
most regions are running a Ricardian policy. 
 
TABLE 1 
 
TABLE 2 
 
                                                 
12 Berlin applied for federal government intervention in October 2006, but its request was repealed by the Federal 
Constitutional Court. 
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There are a few exceptions, though. A closer look at tables 1 and 2 shows that there are a 
few regions in which fiscal policy is non-Ricardian. First, a shock to the surplus in Bremen is 
followed by rises in liabilities. Given that the surplus is positively serially correlated, fiscal 
policy must be NR. Second, there are two Länder, Hessen and Hamburg, where the 
response of liabilities is not significant after a surplus shock. With positive serial correlation 
for at least three years after the shock, fiscal policy can be classified as NR. Finally, the 
surplus to GDP ratio in Sachsen and Thüringen displays negative serial correlation at short 
horizons. In Sachsen, the serial correlation turns negative after one year already. At longer 
horizons, this negative correlation becomes even larger, but is hardly significant. In 
Thüringen in contrast, the correlation becomes negative after two years and is large and 
significant. At longer horizons, it turns positive again. For both Länder, this would again 
indicate an NR regime. 
 
This result is quite striking, given that most of the tests for FTPL have found well behaved 
Ricardian fiscal regimes. Can we associate the NR regime with a particular fiscal policy? The 
NR regime in Bremen should not come as a surprise. This was one of the two regions to be 
bailed out by the federal government in 1992 after debt reached nearly 50% of regional GDP. 
Hessen and Hamburg have been running very stable fiscal policies instead. Actually, both 
are among the richest Germany regions in per capita income. Both Länder are important net 
contributors to the Finanzausgleich. The surpluses they create are skimmed of to regions 
with fiscal trouble. This result tells that there are also significant transfers between regions. 
 
The focus here is on the interaction between different regional governments. According to 
our discussion in section 2, a single NR policy would suffice for making the regime NR for all 
governments. We confirm this result on two accounts. First, we run a panel VAR with the 
same specification. We use a similar Cholesky ordering of the variables as before. The initial 
response to a shock in the surplus is a rise in liabilities. At longer horizons, liabilities start to 
fall but this fall is never significant (table 1). Even if we cannot compute the serial correlation 
of the surplus, regional fiscal policy can clearly be classified as NR. Second, we simply 
aggregate the regional budget data. The previous results suggest horizontal transfers might 
offset NR policies. By aggregating the surplus series, we net out the effect of horizontal 
transfers between regions. The finding of an NR regime for this hypothetical single regional 
government should be stronger then. Indeed, the impulse response after a surplus shock 
shows that liabilities continue to rise until ten years after (figure 4). As the serial correlation of 
this hypothetical surplus is positive, regional fiscal policy is certainly in an NR regime. Both 
results confirm the spillover effect of an NR regime to all governments in the monetary union.  
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FIGURE 4 
 
One might wonder if the results are not due to particular structural breaks. The German fiscal 
system has undergone many changes since 1970. A major break of course is German 
Reunification. The federal government initially bore the brunt of the burden and financed the 
transition with public debt. Since 1995, the former Eastern German regions are incorporated 
in the Finanzausgleich. The basic structure of the German federation has remained, 
however. We find that splitting the sample period in 1990 does not lead to different results 
(table 3). The German fiscal system is characterised by NR regimes both before and after 
the Reunification. Before 1990, only a VAR on aggregate regional budget indicates an NR 
regime (whereas the panel VAR does not). After 1990, a few regions follow NR policies. The 
overall regime is NR. The reform of the fiscal system has affected the amount of transfers, 
but has not led to an overhaul of the interactions between the federal government, the central 
bank and the regions. 
 
TABLE 3 
 
3.4. Results: The federal budget offsets non-Ricardian policies 
 
Does fiscal profligacy at the regional level affect the decisions of the federal government? It 
can only shield the Bundesbank from the fiscal pressure of the Länder if it manages to 
balance the NR regime with a budget that responds to the level of outstanding liabilities. For 
this, the federal government should run a Ricardian policy. This policy is also what we find in 
the VAR. Future liabilities fall after a positive innovation to the surplus (table 1, figure 5). The 
positive serial correlation makes us discard the possibility of a NR regime. 
 
FIGURE 5 
 
The budget policy of the federal government may not be Ricardian enough to offset the effect 
of the NR policies of the Länder. From the previous results, it is clear that the federal 
government has not provided (vertical) transfers to all regions to offset the NR policy. It can 
still do so by compensating within its own budget. We can analyse this by looking at 
consolidated data of the general government. The impulse response function shows that 
liabilities continue to fall after a positive shock to the surplus (table 1, figure 6). Moreover, 
with a positive autocorrelation in the general government surplus, fiscal policy can only be 
Ricardian (table 2). Hence, fiscal policy in Germany is Ricardian. This confirms findings by 
Thams (2007) of a Ricardian regime. We show that a Ricardian regime is the combination of 
Research Institute of Applied Economics 2008                                                                Working Papers 2008/12, 26 pages 
 
 14 
non-Ricardian regional policies and a federal Ricardian budget. The latter stems the spillover 
effect of the former on aggregate economic variables. 
 
The result is robust over different sample periods. Despite the burden of Reunification on the 
federal budget, federal policies follow an R regime both before and after 1990. This again 
suggests that it is the interaction between the various fiscal policies and the single monetary 
policy that matters for the final outcome. 
  
The way in which this can be practically achieved is less clear cut. We find that some regions 
pursue Ricardian policies, while others do not. The finding of a strong NR regime for the 
aggregate regional budget suggests that horizontal transfers play an important role in 
mitigating unsustainable policies. The Finanzausgleich compensates between regions. But 
the fiscal situation of the regions is still deficitary on aggregate. The effect of the vertical 
redistribution of resources is less clear cut. Vertical federal transfers do not offset the NR 
regimes at regional level. A transfer must then occur from at least some other regions in 
order to make the Ricardian policy of the federal government possible. The federal 
government taxes all citizens in all regions. It must tax the regional resources relatively more 
to pursue its Ricardian policy. Only in this way, it can compensate within its own budget 
sufficiently so as to make fiscal policy Ricardian on aggregate. This has also implications for 
the role of the federal government over time. The financing of regional deficits strengthens its 
bargaining position. The implicit tax transfers eventually allow the federal government to 
finance more tasks than regions do. The increasing role of the German federal government 
in (co)financing public spending is a phenomenon we indeed observe (Seitz, 1999) 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
In monetary union, governments may pursue unsustainable fiscal policies and free ride on 
the efforts of other fiscal authorities to come to its rescue. It also exposes the single central 
bank to pressure to relax its stance. The effects of non-Ricardian policies spill over to all 
other governments in the monetary union. Fiscal discipline is not assured if the central bank 
cannot commit to its policy. This requires agreement between governments to constrain the 
use of fiscal policy. There is also another mechanism, however. Most monetary unions have 
a federal government, and a second tier of regional governments. The federal government 
may provide the necessary fiscal means to pay off debt. Ex ante, tax sharing agreements 
and joint spending schemes often provide implicit additional financing of regional budgets. Ex 
post, in extreme cases, this may even entail an explicit bail out. The federal government 
internalises the effect of regional fiscal policies on the common monetary policy stance. If the 
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commitment of the central bank or the set of fiscal rules is not credible, the federal 
government may still shift resources to keep these inflation pressures at bay.  
 
We use a test developed by Canzoneri et al. (2001) for distinguishing Ricardian from non-
Ricardian fiscal regimes to give evidence for this proposition by using data on the federal and 
regional budgets in Germany. The main finding is that the spillover effects from the regions 
that are running unsustainable fiscal policies are indeed countered by the federal 
government. The free riding result between the various regional governments vis-à-vis the 
general government (federal government plus central bank) still holds. However, federal 
fiscal policy has provided a mechanism to avoid that fiscal policies on aggregate are non-
Ricardian. In this way, the federal government has protected the independence of the 
Bundesbank. We interpret this as evidence that the German federal government internalises 
the effect of regional fiscal policies on the common monetary policy stance. At this stage, we 
cannot identify the means by which the federal government does so. The federal government 
could either compensate for insolvency at the regional level by running a strict central 
budget; or alternatively, it might shift resources between governments with taxes and 
transfers. In both cases, non-Ricardian regional fiscal policies do not give rise to aggregate 
rises in the price level. We need more detailed data on the amount of horizontal and vertical 
transfers between federal government and Länder to distinguish such policies.  
 
There are other examples of federations in which regional fiscal policies create 
macroeconomic havoc, with implications for monetary policy. In Argentina, the Finance 
Minister Cavallo eventually had to give in to the pressure of provincial governors that run 
loose budgets. This precipitated the collapse of the currency board and sparked 
hyperinflation in 2002. Germany or Argentina are examples of countries where federal 
relations involve a power game between different tiers and the common central bank. Fiscal 
power is balanced between the federal level and the regions. Not all fiscal federations have 
an identical structure. In some federations, a too strong centre may impose strict rules on 
weak regional governments. In others, a weak federal government could instead be in the 
political hands of the regions, and be fiscally too weak to stand between the regions and the 
central bank. This structure probably depends on historical political circumstances. 
 
This result has quite some implications for fiscal policy in a monetary union. The federal 
government may shield the common central bank that is not able to commit. But the 
existence of the federal government itself exacerbates the free riding problem. Indeed, our 
results do not say that the ECB is bound to give in to fiscal pressure because there is no 
European government backing the bank. First, the central bank can still commit to a tough 
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anti-inflationary stance. Second, a monetary union without a government with fiscal power is 
an effective commitment not to bail out member states. The worries that a single federal 
government could challenge the single central bank are not really founded. Having an 
important fiscal power at EU level would change the interaction between member states, 
however. Also, this federal government could itself be biased to run unsustainable policies, 
something we did not consider in this paper. The choice to grant a European government 
fiscal power is a political one, of course. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Accumulated IRFs of the liabilities/GDP ratio to a shock in the surplus ratio.a) 
years after the shock 2y 5y 8y 
    
Baden-Württemberg -0.0015* -0.0050* -0.0089* 
Bayern -0.0013* -0.0037* -0.0059* 
Hessen -0.0002* 0.0035 0.0092 
Niedersachsen -0.0120* -0.0345* -0.0565* 
Nordrhein Westfalen -0.0034* -0.0136* -0.0267* 
Rheinland Pfalz -0.0037* -0.0100* -0.0163* 
Saarland -0.0065* -0.0258* -0.0495* 
Schleswig Holstein -0.0053* -0.0178* -0.0315* 
Berlin -0.0176* -0.0648* -0.1270* 
Bremen -0.0030 -0.0199 -0.0442 
Hamburg -0.0005 -0.0024 -0.0048 
Brandenburg b) -0.0084* -0.0181* -0.0249* 
Mecklenburg Vorpommern b) -0.0021* -0.0104* -0.0192* 
Sachsen b) -0.0078* -0.0188* -0.0302* 
Sachsen-Anhalt b) -0.0117* -0.0438* -0.0873* 
Thüringen b) -0.0014* -0.0051* -0.0092* 
    
panel VAR c) 0.0143 -0.0068 -0.0445 
regional government 0.0067 0.0208 0.0352 
    
central government -0.0064 -0.0248 -0.0457 
    
general government -0.0182 -0.0567 -0.0975 
    
 
Notes: a) cholesky ordering, surplus ordered first, VAR with 2 lags, impulse response 
for a shock with 1 standard deviation ; b) data are for the period 1991-2005 ; c) panel 
VAR includes only the old Länder. 
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Table 2. Autocorrelation function of the surplus ratio. 
 Baden-Württemberg Bayern Hessen Niedersachsen Nordrhein Westfalen Rheinland-Pfalz 
lag ACF   Q-stat  prob ACF   Q-stat  prob ACF   Q-stat  prob ACF   Q-stat  prob ACF   Q-stat  prob ACF   Q-stat  prob 
1 0.54 11.08 0.00 0.53 10.77 0.00 0.81 11.30 0.00 0.45 7.72 0.01 0.68 7.95 0.01 0.64 15.44 0.00 
2 0.24 13.33 0.00 0.20 12.31 0.00 0.53 16.57 0.00 0.09 8.03 0.02 0.39 10.72 0.01 0.13 16.13 0.00 
3 0.06 13.48 0.00 0.14 13.11 0.00 0.19 17.27 0.00 -0.16 9.10 0.03 0.15 11.18 0.01 -0.10 16.55 0.00 
4 0.05 13.57 0.01 0.21 14.99 0.01 -0.09 17.47 0.00 0.05 9.21 0.06 -0.18 11.87 0.02 -0.10 17.00 0.00 
5 -0.01 13.58 0.02 0.19 16.49 0.01 -0.27 19.23 0.00 0.17 10.42 0.06 -0.26 13.54 0.02 -0.04 17.08 0.00 
 
 Saarland  Schleswig Holstein Berlin Bremen Hamburg Brandenburg 
lag ACF   Q-stat  prob ACF   Q-stat  prob ACF   Q-stat  prob ACF   Q-stat  prob ACF   Q-stat  prob ACF   Q-stat  prob 
1 0.71 19.28 0.00 0.47 8.23 0.00 0.74 20.63 0.00 0.77 10.12 0.00 0.67 7.79 0.01 0.58 12.58 0.00 
2 0.48 28.15 0.00 -0.08 8.47 0.01 0.57 33.34 0.00 0.43 13.56 0.00 0.52 12.88 0.00 0.13 13.25 0.00 
3 0.35 32.96 0.00 -0.15 9.33 0.03 0.47 42.21 0.00 0.16 14.11 0.00 0.18 13.51 0.00 0.09 13.61 0.00 
4 0.16 34.02 0.00 0.04 9.39 0.05 0.27 45.18 0.00 -0.01 14.11 0.01 -0.11 13.78 0.01 0.12 14.22 0.01 
5 0.04 34.08 0.00 0.09 9.75 0.08 0.18 46.50 0.00 -0.14 14.62 0.01 -0.18 14.61 0.01 0.12 14.87 0.01 
 
 Mecklenburg Sachsen  Sachsen-Anhalt Thüringen federal government general government 
lag ACF   Q-stat  prob ACF   Q-stat  prob ACF   Q-stat  prob ACF   Q-stat  prob ACF   Q-stat  prob ACF   Q-stat  prob 
1 0.82 25.77 0.00 0.82 25.77 0.00 0.73 20.05 0.00 0.33 4.13 0.04 0.54 11.10 0.00 0.47 8.73 0.00 
2 0.52 36.40 0.00 0.52 36.40 0.00 0.52 30.49 0.00 0.07 4.33 0.12 0.22 13.01 0.00 0.04 8.79 0.01 
3 0.38 42.37 0.00 0.38 42.37 0.00 0.45 38.78 0.00 -0.10 4.70 0.20 0.09 13.32 0.00 0.01 8.80 0.03 
4 0.31 46.40 0.00 0.31 46.40 0.00 0.30 42.48 0.00 -0.15 5.59 0.23 -0.18 14.59 0.01 -0.15 9.80 0.04 
5 - - - - - - 0.16 43.56 0.00 -0.45 14.40 0.01 -0.21 16.48 0.01 -0.20 11.50 0.04 
     
 
Notes: Q-stat and prob indicate the test statistic and p-value for a significant autocorrelation coefficient. 
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Table 3. Accumulated IRFs of the liabilities/GDP ratio to a shock in the surplus ratio. a) 
 1970-1990 1991-2005 
years after the shock 2y 5y 8y 2y 5y 8y 
      
Baden-Württemberg -0.0017* -0.0063* -0.0109* -0.0020* -0.0048* -0.0079* 
Bayern -0.0033* -0.0092* -0.0143* 0.0003 0.0010 0.0018 
Hessen 0.0014 0.0088 0.0179 -0.0020* -0.0025* -0.0033* 
Niedersachsen -0.0157* -0.0455* -0.0742* -0.0059* -0.0111* -0.0147* 
Nordrhein Westfalen -0.0090* -0.0321* -0.0572* 0.0009 0.0020 0.0035 
Rheinland Pfalz -0.0067* -0.0175* -0.0269* -0.0004* -0.0006* -0.0008* 
Saarland -0.0050* -0.0225* -0.0465* -0.0028* 0.0074 0.0126 
Schleswig Holstein -0.0078* -0.0261* -0.0454* -0.0037* 0.0012 -0.0030* 
Berlin -0.0058* -0.0183* -0.0316* -0.0165* -0.0455* -0.0827* 
Bremen -0.0039* -0.0384* -0.0982* -0.0005* -0.0103* -0.0238* 
Hamburg -0.0019* -0.0073* -0.0129* 0.0077 0.0268 0.0510 
Brandenburg b) --- --- --- -0.0084* -0.0181* -0.0249* 
Mecklenburg Vorpommern b) --- --- --- -0.0021* -0.0104* -0.0192* 
Sachsen b) --- --- --- -0.0078* -0.0188* -0.0302* 
Sachsen Anhalt b) --- --- --- -0.0117* -0.0438* -0.0873* 
Thüringen b) --- --- --- -0.0014* -0.0051* -0.0092* 
   
panel VAR old and new c) --- --- --- 0.0055 0.0121 0.0155 
 old -0.0035* -0.0070* -0.0116* 0.0074 0.0223 0.0455 
 new --- --- --- -0.0191* -0.0345* -0.0469* 
regional government 0.0093 0.0261 0.0421 0.0040 0.0129 0.0226 
  
central government -0.0039* -0.0113* -0.0189* -0.0179* -0.0599* -0.1066* 
  
general government -0.0158* -0.0485* -0.0827* -0.0317* -0.1009* -0.1752* 
  
 
Notes: a) cholesky ordering, liabilities ordered first, VAR with 2 lags, impulse response for a shock with 1 standard 
deviation; b) data are for the period 1991-2005; c) panel VAR includes only the old Länder. 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Germany, 1970-2005: fiscal series for government tiers. 
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Figure 2. German Länder: state surplus ratio (% of state GDP). 
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Figure 3. State debt ratio for German Länder (% of state GDP). 
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Figure 4. IRF of liabilities: response to 1 s.d. shock to surplus, regional government. 
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Figure 5. IRF of liabilities: response to 1 s.d. shock to surplus, federal government. 
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Figure 6. IRF of liabilities: response to 1 s.d. shock to surplus, general government. 
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